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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper examines the risks associated with smart contracts, a disruptive 
FinTech innovation, and assesses how in the future they could threaten the integrity of the 
global financial system. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – A qualitative approach is used to identify risk factors related 
to the use of new financial innovations, by examining how over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives contributed to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007. Based on this analysis, 
the potential for similar concerns with smart contracts are evaluated, drawing on the failure 
of the DAO, which involved the loss of over $60 million of digital currency. 
 
Findings – Extensive use of bilateral agreements, complexity and lack of standardization, 
lack of transparency, misuse, and speed of contagion were factors that contributed to the 
GFC that could also become material concerns for smart contract technology as its adoption 
grows. These concerns, combined with other contextual factors, such as the risk of defects 
in smart contracts and cyberattacks, could lead to potential destabilization of the broader 
financial system. 
 
Practical implications – The paper’s findings provide insights to help make the design, 
management, and monitoring of smart contract technology more robust. They also provide 
guidance for key stakeholders on proactive steps that can be taken with smart contract 
technology to avoid repeating oversights that contributed to the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
Originality/value – This paper draws attention to the risks associated with the adoption of 
disruptive financial technology. It also suggests steps that regulators and other key 
stakeholders can take to help mitigate those risks. 
 
1. Introduction 
The rise of digital ledger technology (DLT) over the past decade has served as a disruptive 
force within financial services and has been driven by financial technology (FinTech) 
companies. While digital currencies, such as bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008), were the first and 
are the furthest developed DLT implementations, many other applications, ranging from land 
registries to transactional systems for trade finance, are under development and undergoing 
testing. One of the more intriguing and promising DLT-related technologies are smart 
contracts (SCs). Smart contracts are, at best, software-based agreements that do not 
involve human mediators for execution (Szabo, 1997); they are now implemented as source 
code instructions that are typically stored and executed on distributed ledger technology. 
Smart contracts have the potential to automate and provide greater efficiency and assurance 
of the execution of contractual terms as compared with traditional contracts. 
  
Like many FinTech innovations, due to their novelty, many of the risks related to smart 
contracts are not fully understood. Yet, given the high velocity of innovation and the rapid 
adoption of FinTech, it is important to consider the broader risks. More specifically, the 
evolution of smart contracts and how a broad expansion of their use could create systemic 
risks and threaten the integrity of the broader financial system. At the present time this risk 
may sound doubtful; however, it is worthwhile to consider the impact that another, relatively 
new financial technology, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, had in the early 2000s: OTC 
derivatives, which served as a catalyst for the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007. 
  
There are a number of risks associated with DLTs and smart contracts that are currently 
understood (Luu et al., 2016; Weaver, 2018), but perhaps the greater risks are those that 
have not yet been uncovered. Because of the novelty of smart contracts, there has been 
limited exploratory analysis and research of their flaws and unexpected characteristics. 
Likewise, the complexity and rapid evolution of the information technology (IT) that 
underpins smart contracts makes it likely that structural and intrinsic risks may persist and 
continue to be found over an extended period of time. It is not unusual for critical security 
vulnerabilities to be found and exploited in decades-old core IT infrastructure components 
such as the 2017 WannaCry ransomware virus that affected old unpatched versions of 
Windows. Furthermore, smart contracts may be combined and interlinked so as to form 
dependencies and create a network of risks that can transcend the risks associated with 
individual contracts. That is to say, features or flaws in individual SCs may not be of major 
concern in themselves, but may lead to compounding risk when combined. 
  
By reviewing how OTC derivatives contributed to the global financial crisis (GFC), similar 
dangers with smart contracts and other FinTech innovations can be identified. It is ironic that 
the use of OTC derivatives led to financial disaster for many financial institutions, when in 
fact those derivatives were designed as tools to help manage financial risk. This case 
demonstrates how new technologies that have a high pace of innovation, coupled with 
increasing usage across a large number of participants, can produce systemic instability 
(Helbing, 2013).  
  
While there are fundamental differences between smart contracts (an information 
technology), and OTC derivatives (a financial innovation) there are also parallels with 
regards to the financial risks they can give rise to. For example, the 1994 bankruptcy of 
Orange County, which was a result of misuse of OTC derivatives (Noris, 1994), presaged 
the role these derivatives would play in the GFC more than a decade later. Similarly, the 
collapse of the Distributed Anonymous Organization (DAO) due to flaws in its use of smart 
contracts (Peck, 2016) could portend greater risks to come as the use of smart contracts 
become more widespread. 
  
This paper analyzes parallels between risks associated with OTC derivatives and smart 
contracts in the context of their potential to destabilize the financial system. The aim is to 
provide insights to help make the design, management, and monitoring of smart contract 
technology more robust and less likely to lead to systemic-level risk. The structure of the rest 
of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews how OTC derivatives served as a catalyst for 
the global financial crisis. Section 3 examines the characteristics of smart contracts and how 
they are used, particular in the context of financial transactions. Section 4 covers the current 
issues and risks associated with smart contracts. Section 5 identifies similarities between 
OTC derivatives at the time of their introduction as a new financial technology and smart 
contracts and discusses how the advancement of smart contracts could lead to concerns 
similar to those caused by OTC derivatives. Section 6 outlines risk mitigation strategies to 
help prevent, detect, and respond to threats that smart contracts may present to financial 
stability. Section 7 concludes with suggested steps that can be taken to provide safeguards 
against potential hazards related to smart contracts that are not currently evident and 
suggests areas for further research.  
 
2. Issues and risks with OTC derivatives that led to financial instability 
This section examines the background, concerns, and remedies to the issues and risks 
associated with OTC derivatives and their contribution to the Global Financial Crisis. 
Specifically, it looks at issues related to derivatives’ complexity, the extensive use of bilateral 
agreements and lack of central counterparties, the use of OTC derivatives by the shadow 
banking system, lack of financial transparency, and speed at which risk-related problems 
unfolded. These factors will be discussed again in Section 5 in the context of similar 
concerns posed by smart contracts. 
 
Background 
Many factors led to the Global Financial Crisis. The overall market environment was clearly 
one factor, where an extended period of low interest rates led to loose credit, use of 
extensive leverage, and an ongoing quest for higher yielding returns. In turn, risk taking 
increased and, in the U.S., a housing price bubble formed (Somanathan et al, 2015). 
Increased global interconnectedness was also clearly a factor that led to cascading risk and 
ultimately led to a crisis of confidence. OTC derivatives, at the time, a relatively young 
financial technology, also were a significant factor. They provide a means for creating new 
forms of leverage and enabled, and in some ways fueled, credit growth. OTC derivatives 
also provided sustenance for the shadow banking sector, which operated outside of 
regulators’ purview. 
  
Leading up to the GFC, the use of OTC derivatives grew substantially, as shown in Figure 1. 
While the OTC derivatives’ ability to be customized to meet specific needs was a large part 
of their appeal, they were also popular because they were not as heavily regulated as listed 
derivatives. In particular, OTC derivatives in the form of credit default swaps (CDS) served 
as a relatively unregulated alternative to purchasing and selling insurance against defaults. 
Limited regulatory oversight of OTC derivatives made them attractive for use within the 
shadow banking system —‘bank-like financial activities that are conducted outside the 
traditional commercial banking system, many of which are unregulated or lightly regulated’ 
(FCIC, 2010). OTC derivatives were an integral part of the business strategies of off-
balance-sheet entities, such as structured investment vehicles (SIV), as well as hedge funds 
and money market funds. Not coincidentally, the growth of the shadow banking sector grew 
in parallel with OTC derivatives to reach a point in 2007 where it was substantially larger 
than the size of the regular banking system in the U.S. (Pozsar et al., 2012). 
 
 Figure 1. Notional amounts outstanding for major OTC derivatives contracts 
 
Because OTC derivative transactions were bilateral (not cleared through a central 
counterparty) and little or no regulatory reporting for their trading was required, the risk with 
their aggregate volumes was not readily apparent. Furthermore, the complexity and 
compound nature of derivative structures made it difficult to identify the ultimate risk bearer. 
For example, mortgage loans were bundled into securities, which were used to create 
derivatives in the form of credit default obligations (CDO). Subsequently, new CDOs were 
created as layers on top of pre-existing CDOs. In other words, older financial technology 
innovations, asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities, were combined with newer 
financial technology innovations in the form of CDOs and credit default swaps, to form 
structures where the risks were difficult to understand, let alone track. In particular, the 
models that credit rating agencies used to assess risk were not designed for the complexity 
and unique characteristics of these structures. 
  
Ultimately, the size, complexity, interconnectedness, and leverage provided by the OTC 
derivative market, combined with opacity of risk exposures, led to a crisis of confidence. 
Lack of confidence in the solvency of counterparties and fears about the risks associated 
with derivatives caused parts of the credit and OTC derivatives markets to seize up. As a 
case in point, once the insolvency of large institutions became apparent as a material risk, 
repurchase agreement (repo) lenders withdrew from the market, in turn, causing the 
confidence crisis to become a liquidity crisis (Baklanova, 2015). In summary, novel use of 
OTC derivatives in conjunction with the financial environment exposed weaknesses in the 
financial market infrastructure. These, in turn, gave rise to financial contagion and ultimately 
led to widespread economic damage. 
  
Concerns 
Having provided background on how OTC derivatives were involved in the GFC, we will next 
examine specific concerns in more detail, particularly as they relate to FinTech innovations. 
However, it is important to first note that OTC derivatives were not intended to be “financial 
weapons of mass destruction” as the prominent investor, Warren Buffet, referred to them. 
Rather, they were designed to reduce risk concentration by enabling risk to be spread 
across multiple and diverse parties (Merton, 2005). Herein lies the overarching consideration 
to bear in mind: it is difficult to predict how and for what purpose new technologies will be 
used over the course of time. 
  
A core concern related to OTC derivatives was the extensive use of bilateral agreements 
between financial counterparties. For the most part, these bilateral agreements were 
exclusive to the parties involved in the agreements and thus, at the time, the types and scale 
of the risk exposure was difficult to assess in aggregate terms. In particular, the CDOs 
market was fragmented, largely relationship-based, and did not have an integrated market 
(Lysandroua et al., 2014). Hence, the insolvency of one counterparty could trigger the 
insolvency of another, creating a chain reaction. In particular, regulators and broader market 
participants had poor visibility of the systemic risks that OTC derivatives presented. When 
the GFC unfolded, they found themselves trying to quickly gather information that was 
necessary to assess the situation and formulate a suitable reaction. Lack of information led 
to a trial and error approach to remediation, rather than being able to follow a response plan 
(Gregory, 2014). 
  
The extensive use of OTC derivatives by the shadow banking system further complicated 
the understanding of the interconnections, scope, and scale of how OTC derivatives were 
used. In other words, there was insufficient financial transparency. By the nature of banks’ 
off-balance-sheet vehicles being exempt from systematic regulation, they were able to 
amass large amounts of risk. The opaqueness of the shadow banking market and the 
complexity of the risk constituted by its OTC derivative holdings led to doubts and confusion 
in the broader financial system and contributed to the liquidity crisis (Lysandroua et al., 
2014). The combination of the growth of the shadow banking system along with its 
increasing use of leverage, which was facilitated by the use of OTC derivatives, led to a 
point where the shadow banking system became a systemic risk. 
  
The speed at which different reactions occurred was also a major challenge within the GFC. 
On one hand, the market was reacting almost instantaneously, revaluing risk premiums in 
real-time and creating liquidity draughts overnight. On the other hand, much of the 
information related to the financial instruments that underpinned the crisis, could not be 
quickly amassed and evaluated. Lack of digitalization and automation of many OTC 
derivative contracts created an information gap that limited the effectiveness of the crisis 
response. In turn, the speed of contagion and collapse by far outpaced the rate of which a 
well-informed response policy could be implemented. 
  
Post-crisis Remedies 
To address the concern related to the extensive counterparty risk created by excessive 
bilateral contractual exposures, global regulators required many OTC derivatives to be 
cleared through central counterparties. This change eliminated counterparty risk directly 
between the users of OTC derivatives. This rule was applied to standardized contracts, 
which represented a large portion of the OTC derivative market. However, it was not 
practical for more tailored derivatives that had unique structures and parameters. The risk 
associated with those bespoke agreements could not be readily determined and managed 
by a central counterparty. 
  
To address the problem of financial transparency, the G20’s Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) initiated a process of financial data reporting for OTC derivatives across multiple 
jurisdictions (BIS, 2012; FSB, 2015). Derivative transactions were required to be reported 
within a short period, typically one day after the trade was completed, to a trade repository 
that was sanctioned by the relevant regulatory body. Types of transactions that were 
reportable and entities that were required to report varied by regulatory jurisdiction. Table 1 
shows the coverage and implementation schedule of OTC derivatives trade reporting for 
G20 countries. 
 
Table 1 Implementation schedule of OTC derivatives trade reporting 
Jurisdiction Initial Compliance Date 
United States 12 Oct 2012 
European Union 12 Feb 2014 
Japan 1 Apr 2013 
Singapore 1 Apr 2014 
Hong Kong 9 Dec 2013 
Australia 1 Oct 2013 
 
Problems related to the use of OTC derivatives by the shadow banking system, were 
addressed largely by ratings agencies increasing their oversight of off-balance-sheet 
securitization vehicles, such as SIVs, which improved transparency (Bean, 2008). 
Additionally, the trade reporting in some regulatory jurisdictions required OTC derivatives 
transactions with nonbank entities, such as hedge funds, to also be captured. 
  
Moreover, there was a shift towards automation in the back-office processing of OTC 
derivatives. While this was desirable from an efficiency standpoint, it was more of a 
necessity to ensure timely and accurate regulatory reporting of transactional and outstanding 
position information.  
 
In summary, OTC derivatives contributed to the GFC as a result of their proliferation as 
bilateral agreements, complexity and lack of standardization, lack of transparency, misuse, 
and speed of contagion when problems occurred. Having examined how a new financial 
technology contributed to financial instability, the next two sections will provide background 
on and discuss issues and risk related to smart contracts, a new information technology. 
 
3. The characteristics of smart contracts  
This section examines the characteristics of smart contracts and their use, particular in the 
context of financial transactions. The term “smart contracts” was introduced by Nick Szabo in 
a paper in 1997 (Szabo, 1997) as automated legal agreements with automated penalties, 
but the term did not come into mainstream use until the Ethereum Foundation used the term 
to refer to pieces of code deployed on the Ethereum DLT in 2013 (Vitalik 2013). “Smart 
contracts” is now a generic term used in the DLT community to describe the building blocks 
of distributed applications (dApps) on Ethereum. On Corda, IBM Hyperledger Fabric and 
other DLTs there is the same concept of smart contracts but sometime referred to by other 
names such as “chaincode”. 
 
The implementation of smart contracts differs from traditional software applications in that 
the programmatic source code used to construct smart contracts is deployed onto an 
immutable data store in a DLT. As the code cannot be changed a new version must be 
deployed and all pointers to the code must be updated to the code’s new location on the 
blockchain.  
 
There are many different implementation platforms for smart contracts, and the available 
functionality varies. For example, Bitcoin has limited functions such as time lock, whereas 
Ethereum’s smart contracts are “Turing complete”, which means that any programmatic 
function can be coded within them. Smart contracts can be written in many programming 
languages, which are often converted to common byte code that is stored and executed on 
its DLT. Solidity is a particular programming language designed for smart contracts and the 
most common language used to construct smart contracts that run on Ethereum. 
 
After a software developer writes a smart contract, it is deployed onto the DLT, validated for 
correctness (by miners on the Ethereum DLT) and then it is available to be called by any 
authorized party. This is ideal for business processes that span multiple organisations. For 
example, in the context of trade finance, a letter of credit is requested from an issuing bank 
by an importer of goods, the document is sent to the importer’s advising bank, and then 
authorised by the exporter. Many steps in this process are currently performed manually 
which is slow and error prone. Using a smart contract application to manage letters of credit, 
all parties involved in the process can be authorised to see the document and processing 
status in real-time and take action accordingly. 
 
Smart contracts can also call other smart contracts and there is no limit to the complexity of 
the applications that can be built. Furthermore, processing can take place between 
independent DLTs, such as Corda and Quorum further increasing the potential capabilities 
and the interconnectedness of data and processes. 
 
Cryptocurrencies are one category of application that have been built using DLTs and, whilst 
being the initiator of the first DLT, bitcoin, their use is to transfer value between parties in a 
DLT. Cryptocurrencies can also be used as a way to support a DLT platform such as using 
Ether (the native cryptocurrency of Ethereum) to reward the miners for validating data and 
smart contracts in the DLT. Cryptocurrencies may also represent a physical asset such as 
real estate or diamonds or it may represent national currencies (Dale B. 2018).  
 
Some of the key reasons DLTs and smart contracts are gaining in popularity include:  
● Convenient - DLT technology offers fast, secure and convenient transaction 
processing.  
● Low cost - smart contracts can remove intermediaries, such as banks, from 
processes, thus reducing transaction costs. 
● Decentralization - no central organisation is required to execute smart contracts since 
the accounting activities are distributed across many different entities on the network. 
● Transparency - DLT technology allows the details of every single transaction in the 
network to be stored in an immutable form. These records form audit trails that are 
available for inspection by authorised parties. 
● Pseudonymity - DLT and smart contract users’ identities are stored by unique 
identifiers that typically cannot be used alone to determine the identity of the user.  
 
The current use of DLTs in finance is still very much in its infancy. There are a number of 
companies running proof-of-concept exercises, and some in a pilot phase, for example 
HSBC trade finance deal in May 2018 (HSBC 2018). There is a long way to go before the 
technology, operations and governance for DLT and smart contracts are ready to support 
large volumes and sensitive customer data but DLT applications offer great potential for 
business process that involves multiple parties. As the technology, security, governance of 
DLT and other issues and risks are being addressed over time and there is little doubt that 
decentralised solutions will become prevalent, integrating with centralised systems where 
necessary. The next section will highlight some of the key issues and risks that are currently 
concerns for the development and use applications based on smart contracts 
 
4. Current issues and risks with smart contracts 
Besides having the inherent risks of new technologies, DLTs have their own unique 
drawbacks as well. In the context of financial stability this section looks at a number of 
attacks on DLTs that can exploit vulnerabilities in the consensus protocol, data storage, 
applications connecting to DLTs, and bugs in smart contract code. Systemic problems could 
also arise from the complexity, interconnectedness, unexpected behaviour, and change 
management of smart contracts. For this paper the “DAO attack” on the Ethereum DLT is 
most interesting and will be covered in more depth. 
 
Consensus 
The most critical element of DLTs is the consensus mechanism that ensures all data in the 
DLT is validated and that all the nodes in the network have a consistent copy of the entire 
ledger. The most well-used method is the “Proof of Work” (PoW) consensus protocol that is 
used to validate bitcoin transactions. However, PoW requires a significant amount of 
electrical power and only performs at a low processing rate of 16 transactions per second. 
Other consensus protocols are in use and more are being developed that are faster and less 
power hungry such as Raft, Proof-of-Stake and Hashgraph to name a few.  
 
Any flaws in the consensus protocol, such as allowing a collusion of participants to change 
valid data, runs the risk of organisations legally misusing or even exploiting the flaw for 




Data stored on a DLT is visible to all nodes and to make transactional data private, it has to 
be stored in an encrypted form on the DLT or stored outside of the DLT, i.e. “off-chain”. 
Storing data in an encrypted form is risky if new technology, such as quantum computing, is 
developed that can break the encryption method used and hence, make the data readable. 
Alternatively, a vulnerability could be discovered with the encryption protocol used that 
renders it insecure. Storing data off-chain but keeping a reference to data on the DLT keeps 
the data safe, allows for validation if required and also allows the data to be destroyed if 
necessary, according to data management policies. The drawback of storing data off-chain 
is that the transactional process becomes dependent on the availability of a trusted party 
that provides the storage facility.  
 
The balance here is to allow data to be as accessible as needed for the parties involved but 
as secure as possible to avoid data leakage. Regulators may also need access to the data 
to ensure transparency of risks (Table 2). 
 
Platform Component Security 
The most common cybersecurity problems that DLTs have encountered so far have been 
vulnerabilities in various peripheral components that work with and support DLTs, such as 
digital wallets and cryptocurrency exchanges. These have been hacked often (Neuron, 
2018) and for example Mt Gox, which was the largest bitcoin intermediary and the world's 
leading bitcoin exchange, had a security breach on 19 June 2011 when it was announced 
that approximately 850,000 bitcoins belonging to customers and the company were missing 
and likely stolen, an amount valued at more than $450 million at the time. Also notable is a 
Hong Kong-based cryptocurrency exchange platform, Bitfinex which had 120,000 bitcoin, 
worth $72 million, stolen on 2 August 2016 due to a failure in their multi-signature wallets. 
More recently, in June 2018, hackers stole US$40 million in various cryptocurrency tokens 
from the Korean exchange Coinrail. It is important to acknowledge these problems with the 
current cryptocurrency organizations but at the same time it is crucial to recognize that these 
were all centralized entities that got hacked due to security issues that are not directly 
related to the cryptographic protocols. In other words, so far, no blockchain has been hacked 
directly (Risber J. 2018). 
 
Standardisation and certification of platform components would help create a more robust 
DLT eco-system by component reuse, reducing complexity and increasing the ability to 
assess risks (Table 2). However, it should be noted that standardization also increases the 
speed and impact of problems discovered in the components. 
 
Smart Contract Breaches 
Beyond the cybersecurity threats to DLTs and cryptocurrencies, smart contracts have their 
own unique security concerns. These have led to problems such as the The DAO losing 
US$55 million in 2016, ShadowFork freezing US$1 million in 2018, and Parity losing US$50 
million and freezing another $150 million in 2017. (Morisander, 2018). 
 
The most analysed case is a The DAO which was a smart contract distributed application 
running on the Ethereum platform as a decentralised autonomous organisation (DAO). It 
was set up by a group of people to run a crowdfunding organisation that was operated 
entirely using smart contracts. The idea of DAOs have been around for some time (Dilger, 
1997) and is ideally a legally incorporated entity that runs as a business but is fully 
automated. In June 2016, hackers exploited a vulnerability in The DAO code that enabled 
them to siphon off one third of The DAO's funds to a subsidiary account. In this case, there 
were two problems, the flaw that enabled the hacking and the reaction to the problem.  
 
The hack was initiated due to a coding bug in one of the functions in the smart contracts 
running The DAO that allows users to spin off a separate company, take their money from 
the original company and transfer it to the new one. The code was re-entrant --i.e. it could be 
interrupted during its execution and then be initiated again before its earlier invocation had 
completed-- and subsequent invocations did not check if the funds had already been 
withdrawn. The hacker called the function multiple time removing their same funds multiple 
times. By chance there was other, unrelated, code that stopped the attacker from 
immediately moving the funds from their account out of the Ethereum network.  
 
What is also relevant for this paper is that after the attack had been discovered, two groups 
formed within the Ethereum community with different opinions on what to do. One group 
believed that the cryptocurrency that had been stolen should be deactivated so the hacker 
would not gain from their actions. This approach required changing some Ethereum code 
and a second group formed that opposed this approach because it went against the 
underlying philosophy that The DAO’s behaviour should be determined only by its original 
code and without external interference. The code change was made, but the second group 
of “purists” continued to use the old DLT prior to the change. This created a fork in the DLT 
and resulted in two cryptocurrencies Ethereum, which used the new DLT, and Ethereum 
Classic, which uses the original DLT (Leising, 2017). 
 
Given the newness of smart contracts, other attacks and programming errors will likely be 
found and additional risks that smart contracts present include the lack of precedence for 
resolving conflicts that arise with smart contracts. It is unclear how corporate law and 
regulatory agencies might treat automated organisations, such as The DAO, and contracts 
made with and within it when issues arise. With The DAO, there was also a risk that a 
“corporate veil” would not apply to protect investors from individual legal and financial liability 
for actions taken by The DAO and by contractors in which The DAO invested. Furthermore, 
from a legal and regulatory perspective it is unclear in many jurisdictions whether The DAO 
(and recent cryptocurrency token providers) were selling securities, and if they are, what 
type of securities those might be. 
 
Similar to component risks mentioned above, standardisation of smart contracts would help 
create a more robust DLT eco-system by reuse by reducing complexity and increasing the 
ability to assess risks (Table 2). However, standardization can also increase the speed and 
impact of problems discovered in a smart contract. 
 
Interconnectedness 
The final risk to be addressed is that smart contracts can, and do, call other smart contracts 
within DLTs and across DLTs to facilitate end-to-end business processes, for example, 
cross-border settlement (MAS 2017). The interconnectedness of smart contracts could lead 
to a ripple effect and a rapid propagation of problems from one DLT to another. Likewise, it 
will increase the complexity of the DLT eco-system, thus increasing the risk of changes to 
the system, making it more difficult to identify potential issues, and making the resolution of 
problems more difficult and complicated (Table 2). 
 
Having reviewed some of the known issues and risks with smart contracts, the next section 
will examine these and consider how they compare with problems encountered previously 
with OTC derivatives.  
5. Parallels between OTC derivatives and smart contracts in relation to financial 
integrity  
At first glance, there may seem to be little commonality between OTC derivatives and smart 
contracts. The former is a financial technology that is based on written legal agreements, 
whereas the latter is an information technology based on digital ledger technology. 
Nevertheless, there are several similarities worth examining, as outlined in Table 2. These, 
in conjunction with other risks that are specific to smart contracts, could potentially threaten 
the integrity of the financial system under certain circumstances. 
  
Table 2 Similarity of risks between OTC derivatives and smart contracts 
Risk Affect with OTC Derivatives Potential concern with smart 
contracts 
Proliferation of bilateral 
agreements 
Critical levels of counterparty risk 
that was difficult to assess the 
systemic impact 
Flaws or problems with smart 
contracts could undermine the 
integrity of vast numbers of 
corporate agreements leading to a 
crisis of confidence 
Complexity and lack of 
standardization 
Unique and complex financial 
structures made it difficult to 
assess risks  
Unique and complex technical 
implementations make it difficult to 
assess risks 
Lack of transparency Led to lack of trust between market 
participants and a crisis of 
confidence; hindered regulatory 
monitoring of aggregate risk  
Anonymity could lead to difficulty in 
assessing risk exposure and 
remediating crisis situations  
Misuse  Enabled the shadow banking 
system to avoided regulatory 
oversight, hiding potential financial 
risk 
Use by legitimate and unlawful 
businesses to circumvent legal and 
regulatory restrictions, hiding 
potential financial risk 
Speed of contagion Regulators and governments could 
not respond as fast as the markets 
reacted  
The technology would act so fast 
that regulators and governments 
would not be able to intervene, 
only respond after the fact 
 
The proliferation of bilateral OTC derivative agreements, which led to critical financial 
dependencies between counterparties could easily occur with smart contracts when the use 
and sophistication of smart contracts grows to the point where they are facilitate businesses 
transactions on a regular basis. Without a specific need or mandate to centrally clear or 
settle smart contract agreements, there is little reason why agreements should not be 
bilateral and thus, known only to the counterparties involved. Likewise, because of the 
relative ease of implementing smart contracts, the ultimate scale of the number of smart 
contract agreements could easily dwarf traditional contracts. Systemic risk could arise from 
failure or flaws with of the contractual mechanics, i.e. smart contract technology, rather than 
the agreements themselves. It is unclear how millions of bilateral agreements between 
thousands of counterparties could be dealt with, say in the case of the discovery of a 
cybersecurity vulnerability that was common to a large number of agreements, which could 
corrupt those transactions. The fact that the collapse of The DAO was a non-event 
systemically was largely due to its recent invention. Had it been established longer, with 
more investors, larger in financial size, or had it been used as the base source code for other 
smart contracts, the impact could have been much more severe. While, overall, the scale of 
smart contract use does not present an immediate concern, their impact would be significant 
if and when major business areas, such as trade finance, adopt and employ smart contracts 
on a wide-scale basis.  
  
The problems related to complexity and lack of standardization, which were encountered 
with OTC derivatives, are also potential risks for smart contracts. The customization of smart 
contracts increases the risk of design and implementation errors, as was the case with The 
DAO, as well as makes it more difficult to assess their potential risk under various 
conditions. The time required to analyze and fully understand the structure of each unique 
agreement increases the challenge of quantifying aggregate risk. The availability of different 
technology platforms for implementing smart contracts, as well as different versions of the 
same platform, adds further to the challenge of assessing and managing their risk. 
  
Concerns related to lack of transparency, which occurred with OTC derivatives, could be an 
issue for smart contracts. Without understanding who the counterparties are in different 
types of smart contract agreements, how many of those agreements are in place, what the 
aggregate financial risk that is represented by these agreements, it will be difficult to assess 
the systemic risk. Having a handle on such information would be critical in a situation in the 
future where there is a fault in the smart contract infrastructure. As seen in the case of The 
DAO, the investors were anonymous, and the individuals and corporate bodies affected 
could not be easily determined. Assessing the broader impact and entities affected would be 
paramount for avoiding a crisis of confidence, as occurred in the GFC. While the use of 
DLTs could provide a source of open and immutable records that could be used in such 
emergency situations, the value of this information would be dependent on how easily it 
could be accessed and interpreted. 
  
Like OTC derivatives, smart contracts could potentially be used to circumvent regulatory 
oversight. Digital currencies provide an example of how DLT technology has been adopted 
by entities outside of the mainstream financial system. To avoid financial transaction 
monitoring and anti-money laundering (AML) checks instituted by banks, cybercriminals 
have leveraged digital currencies, such as bitcoin. Likewise, banks’ reluctance to facilitate 
digital currency transactions, has further led to the emergence and growth of digital currency 
exchanges. These exchanges, in some cases, have avoided regulatory oversight and thus 
have become part of the shadow banking system. In the case of smart contracts, they may 
inadvertently, or by design, taken on characteristics of other financial instruments but 
avoided treatment as such. This in turn could lead to significant off-balance-sheet exposures 
that are not readily apparent to auditors or regulators. 
  
The fully automated nature of smart contracts, could greatly accelerate the speed at which a 
financial crisis related to them would unfold. If there was a large-scale failure related to smart 
contracts, it is unlikely that regulators would be able to manage the situation as it occurred; 
they may only be able to take remedial action after its course was run. As a case in point, 
the high degree of automation and interconnectedness of electronic trading in the financial 
markets have led to several “flash crashes” that occurred with such speed: it has not been 
possible to determine the underlying cause and remedies until long after the problem 
occurred (CFTC, 2010). Where regulators had hours and days to take actions to try to limit 
the damage in the GFC, a chain reaction that involved many interconnected smart contracts 
could be over in a matter of minutes or seconds. Likewise, while historically, regulators have 
had the ability to nullify paper-based legal agreements by fiat, they will likely find it more 
difficult to intervene and stop or alter the automated execution of smart contracts. 
 
6. Risk mitigation strategies for smart contracts 
With these common risk areas in mind, this section considers what can be done to mitigate 
and reduce the likelihood of the use of smart contracts leading to systemic financial 
instability. Generally, the goals of risk mitigation are prevention, detection and effective 
response which can be largely achieved by means of standardisation, surveillance, data 
collection and analysis. The specific risk areas that are considered and the corresponding 
mitigations are shown in Table 3. All of these risks can be amplified by the growth of the DLT 
and smart contract ecosystem; however, by pressing for technical improvements, better 
monitoring, and robust standards in DLT and smart contract technology, regulatory bodies 
could reduce the risks that have been outlined. The next subsection identifies the areas 
where DLT and smart contracts could be enhanced. The subsection that follows it will show 
how those improvements help to reduce risk. 
 
Table 3. Summary of risks and mitigations for smart contracts 
Risk Mitigation 
Proliferation of bilateral agreements  Monitoring 
Complexity and lack of standardization Standardized data and code, regulatory sandbox 
Lack of transparency Monitoring 
Misuse Monitoring, proactive regulation 
Speed of contagion Throttles and kill switches 
 
Enhancements 
Standardisation of data and code in smart contracts is a major factor that would improve 
their robustness, and enable an automated environment to be created that supports robust 
testing and certification. Standardised data structures can provide references that make it 
easier to identify anomalies and detect defects and standardised code brings about 
consistent processing, with less room for unexpected behaviours. These can ensure that 
basic “hygiene” functions such as limit checking and reporting are included. Standards could 
also include mandatory failsafe mechanisms, such as throttle-backs and kill-switches, that 
could provide a means for regulators or other government bodies to intervene during a crisis.  
 
Another area of improvement could be the use of more restrictive programming languages 
for constructing smart contracts. Most smart contracts are written in languages that are 
“Turing complete” meaning that they can perform any operation. This enables the 
applications to perform any function, but also allows many types of bugs to be introduced 
into the code. By limiting the flexibility of the coding language, the range of potential defects 
would also be reduced (Egelund-Muller, 2017). Ideally, a ‘sweet spot’ would be found 
whereby a language would provide sufficient capabilities for most smart contract processing, 
but no more. Use of more restrictive programming languages could also make it easier to 
automatically analyze smart contract code to reduce risk and improve efficiency. Leveraging 
development and deployment environments that facilitate code reuse, instead of code 
copying, would also decrease the number of defects in smart contract code when corrections 
are made to the code. 
 
Data collection and monitoring is another area of enhancement. The data stored in a DLT is 
robust in that it can be validated by multiple parties before being finally stored and made 
immutable, and it can also be publicly inspected. However, the data is siloed within each 
DLT network and can be buried in blocks of thousands of transactions. Given that it is likely 
that many different DLTs will proliferate, real-time data collection, aggregation and analysis 
will be critical for monitoring purposes. Current DLT platforms provide functions for data to 
be communicated to off-chain storage facilities. Additionally, they could provide functions to 
allow distribution of transaction details or status information to be communicated on 
channels dedicated for transactional monitoring and data collection. Super-node validation is 
common in many private DLTs and is a structure to consider for constant monitoring of the 
networks and for implementing crisis management. Super-nodes could also communicate 
warnings and have agreed protocols for crisis response. 
 
Enhanced regulatory involvement is another area that would help reduce risks if 
implemented in a way that does not impede innovation or create regulatory arbitrage 
situations. A regulatory “sandbox” --a special set of rules that enables businesses to perform 
limited tests of innovations in a live environment without having to comply with the full set of 
regulatory guidance that would be required for a regular implementation-- has been 
implemented in several countries and has room for further enhancement (Ng, 2018). The 
sandbox could be further extended to support automated testing, registration and 
certification for smart contracts and DLTs. In this case, the owner of the smart contract could 
provide the code in a specific format so that the automation would automatically analyse and 
document the code, test the behavior, and analyze the complexity and viability of the smart 




Problems related to the proliferation of bilateral agreements can be addressed by monitoring 
smart contract agreements. If all agreements are executed by smart contracts and the DLT 
platforms they run on are open to inspection and can be easily interpreted by auditors and 
regulators, then monitoring oversight would be fairly straightforward. However, it is more 
likely that obtaining smart contract data from multiple DLTs in many different formats would 
make this approach impractical. Alternatively, built-in reporting capabilities within smart 
contracts could provide automated reporting of contractual details and lifecycle events to 
regulatory bodies, enabling them to monitor smart contract usage on a continual basis. This 
approach could also address risks related to lack of transparency. While it would be 
impractical to require monitoring for all smart contracts, it may be possible to prescribe 
monitoring requirements for classes of smart contracts that present significant risk.  
 
The complexity of smart contracts is likely to increase as more assets become digitized on 
DLT platforms and more DTL platforms are developed. Code and data standardization will 
enable automated analysis of potential defects and behavior abnormalities in vitro. Likewise, 
regulatory sandbox enhancements, as described above, would help monitor how the 
complexities of smart contracts may interact and create problems in vivo. Lack of 
standardization could be tackled by the establishment of best practice guidelines for 
constructing smart contracts and, potentially, verified and enforced by testing in regulatory 
sandbox environments. 
 
The risks of the misuse of smart contracts is likely to always be present as long as there are 
incentives and means to avoid oversight. Monitoring and reporting of smart contract activity 
would enable illicit or questionable smart contract transactions to be identified. Likewise, 
proactive regulatory steps, could be taken to reduce the risk of misuse. For example, to 
address issues related to the potential anonymity of the parties involved in transactions, use 
of standardized legal entity identifiers could be required so that the participants could be 
accurately identified. Likewise, if smart contracts were used in high volumes to hold funds in 
escrow and facilitate transfers, counterparty risk could balloon without having netting 
facilities in place. In this case, it may be prudent to require certain types of smart contracts to 
be settled via a central counterparty or consortium rather than through bilateral agreements. 
Note however, that the approach of relying on a centralized service provider is inherently at 
odds with the decentralized model that DLT platforms espouse.  
 
The speed of contagion between smart contracts in a DLT environment is perhaps the most 
likely risk that could lead to a financial crisis. However, the use of standardized designs for 
smart contracts that include embedded failsafe mechanisms will help prevent chain reactions 
from getting out of control. Likewise, robust monitoring and reporting capabilities will enable 
rapid detection. Moreover, testing in a sandbox environment can support the development 
and testing of crisis response plans.  
 
7. Conclusion  
This paper has identified a number of potential risks related to smart contracts that could 
trigger financial instability and has reviewed past problems with OTC derivatives as a context 
for understanding these risks. Mitigations have also been suggested to help manage these 
risks, with the aim of helping to ensure that the financial ecosystem built upon smart 
contracts is stable and secure. As a conclusion, this section briefly discusses the relevance 
of exogenous risks for smart contracts, identifies areas for future research, and considers 
the trade-offs between various levels of regulatory intervention in rapidly developing 
FinTech, such as smart contracts. 
 
Unlike OTC derivatives, where the risks were primarily endogenous and related to their 
usage by market participants, smart contracts also face substantial exogenous risks. 
Cyberattacks that target smart contract code directly or the DLT infrastructure that it relies 
upon could also lead to business disruptions and potential financial instability. Physical 
disasters, both natural or man-made, could also disrupt the processing of some or all smart 
contracts, causing major turmoil. The disruption to interbank payments following the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 provides an example of how external events can cripple 
what appear to be resilient systems (Lacker, 2003). While in this case, regulators were able 
to intervene to help avoid a banking crisis, they may not have the same latitude if a similar 
type of problem were to occur with smart contracts.  
 
Based on this analysis, there are several areas of future research that would be valuable. 
One area of interest is research on the mechanisms that can be incorporated into smart 
contracts to facilitate regulatory reporting. Another area is how smart contract programming 
languages can be constructed and used to reduce the risk of programming defects. It would 
also be helpful to better understand and model how the interconnectedness of smart 
contracts could cause potentially destabilizing chain reactions. Likewise, there are a number 
of interesting questions related to the legal consequences of flaws or defects that might arise 
with smart contracts, e.g. who is liable in cases where problems result from the interactions 
of multiple smart contracts. Finally, research into the characteristics of a regulatory 
environment or environments that can help ensure robust and transparent regulated 
transactions including further work on the open source development of legal repositories of 
clauses (Selman 2018). 
 
As always, there is a trade-off between the cost and value of adding controls and monitoring 
to rapidly evolving FinTech, such as smart contracts, with the aim of avoiding potential 
catastrophes. On one hand, excessive intervention slows growth and stifles innovation. On 
the other hand, taking a laissez faire approach is imprudent given the likelihood of the 
eventual problems that may arise. It is important for guidelines to be put in place at an early 
stage of the development process to help set expectations as to what best practices are 
necessary. Doing so too late in the process may result in the persistence of vulnerabilities 
and risks that have been already embedded in infrastructure components. Likewise, 
requiring changes to established practices could lead to disaffection within the ecosystem. 
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that innovation in financial and information 
technology are forces that help boost economies, and in turn, help to stave off financial 
crises. Thus, it is disadvantageous to place too heavy of demands on them without cause. In 
many cases, it may be judicious to closely monitor the progression of the technology, plan 
responses for potential disruptions, and be able to quickly respond with preventative 
measures when specific risks become clearly apparent. 
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